Volume 107

Issue 1

Article 8

September 2004

The Doctrine of Judicial Deference and the Independence of the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
R. Henry Moore

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Oil, Gas,
and Mineral Law Commons

Recommended Citation
R. H. Moore, The Doctrine of Judicial Deference and the Independence of the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Review Commission, 107 W. Va. L. Rev. (2004).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol107/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @
WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Moore: The Doctrine of Judicial Deference and the Independence of the Fe

THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND
THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL MINE
SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

R. Henry Moore
1.

II.

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 188
DEFERENCE TO AGENCIES' INTERPRETATIONS .................................... 190

A.
B.
III.

DEFERENCE UNDER THE 1977 MINE ACT ............................................ 197

A.
B.
C.

IV .

Chevron Deference to Agencies' Interpretations
190
of Statutes ................................................................................
Deference to Agencies 'InterpretationsofRegulations........... 194
197
Case Law Development ...........................................................
Application of the Deference DoctrinesIgnores the
Languageand Structure of the 1977 Mine Act ........................ 202
The Problems with Deference Under the 1977 Mine Act ........ 205
Concerns About Deference Generally ........................ 205
1.
Concerns About Deference to MSHA ........................ 208
2.
There Needs to be an Adequate Check on
a.
MSHA 's Authority ......................................... 209
The General Nature of MSHA 's Regulations
b.
and MSHA 's Inconsistent Enforcement
Require Independent Review ......................... 211

C ON CLU SION ......................................................................................... 214

Henry Moore has practiced in the area of mine safety and health and occupational safety
and health law since 1978.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2004

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 107, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 8
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 107

I. INTRODUCTION

When the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 ("1969
Coal Act")' was amended and expanded by the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Act of 1977 ("1977 Mine Act"), rulemaking and enforcement activities were
assigned to the Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration ("MSHA")
within the Department of Labor. 3 The authority to adjudicate cases was assigned
to the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission ("Review Commission") and its administrative law judges. 4 Such an
arrangement is known in ad5
model.
"split-enforcement"
a
as
law
ministrative
This model may be contrasted with the more usual arrangement in
which all the functions, rulemaking, enforcement and adjudication are housed
within a single agency. 6 The single agency model was, in fact, the model utilized in the 1969 Coal Act
where all the functions were consolidated within the
7
Department of Interior.
When the 1977 Mine Act was passed, the change in administrative
model was seen as an improvement over the single agency approach because it
created an independent body to review MSHA's actions. The Senate SubCommittee that drafted the provision of the 1977 Mine Act creating the Review
Commission believed that an independent review body was essential to a fair
process of regulation:

I
2

Pub.L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (1969). Codified in 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-825 (1976).
Pub.L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (1977). The act is now codified in chapter thirty of the

United States Code. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 801 - 825 (2000).
References herein to MSHA include the Secretary of Labor. Litigation under the 1977 Mine
Act is conducted by the Secretary on behalf of MSHA but MSHA will be used in this Article for
consistency of reference.
3

See 30 U.S.C. §§ 811, 813, 823 (2000). In this arrangement, the Review Commission was
also given certain policy-making authority. 30 U.S.C. §§ 823(d)(2)(A)(ii)(iv), 823(d)(2)(B)
(2000). See also James A. Lastowka & Arthur G. Sapper, Deference to Agency Interpretations:
Abdication to Ambiguity, 20 ENERGY & MIN. L. INST. 103, 112 (2000); L. Joseph Ferrara, Summary of Significant Decisions and Issues in the FederalMine Safety and Health Review Commission and the Courts in Eastern Mineral Law Foundation in MINE SAFETY & HEALTH SPECIAL
INST. 6.07 (1994).
4

See, e.g., Drummond Co., 14 F.M.S.H.R.C. 661, 675 & n.15 (1992); George R. Johnson,
The Split-Enforcement Model. Some Conclusions From OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39
ADMIN. L. REv. 315, 315-16 (1987). Others prefer to characterize it as a "split-authority" or "splitfunction model." See Johnson, supra, at 349 & n.4; W. Christian Schumann, The Allocation of
Authority Under the Mine Act: Is the Authority to Decide Questions of Policy Vested in the Secretary ofLabor or in the Review Commission?, 98 W.VA. L. REv. 1063, 1103 (1996).
6
Johnson, supra note 5, at 315.
5

7

See, e.g., Lastowka & Sapper, supra note 4, at 112-13.
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The bill provides a right to contest orders and proposed penalties before the Commission.
The Committee realizes that alternatives to the establishment of
a new independent reviewing body exist. For example, under
the present Coal Act, review of contested matters is an internal
function of the Secretary of the Interior who has established a
Board of Mine Operations Appeals to separate his prosecutorial
and investigative functions from his adjudicatory functions.
The Committee also recognizes that there are organizational and
administrative justifications for avoiding the establishment of
new administrative agencies. However, the Committee believes
that the considerations favoring a completely independent adjudicatory authority outweigh these arguments.
The Committee believes that an independent Commission is essential to provide administrative adjudication which preserves
8
due process and instills much more confidence in the program.
Senator Williams, one of the chief architects of the 1977 Mine Act, also
commented on the independent role of the Commission:
One of the essential reforms of the mine safety program is the
creation of an independent Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission charged with the responsibility for assessing
civil penalties for violations of safety or health standards, for
reviewing the enforcement activities of the Secretary of Labor,
and for protecting miners against unlawful discrimination.
It is our hope that in fulfilling its responsibilities under the Act,
the Commission will provide just and expeditious resolution of
disputes, and will develop a uniform and comprehensive interpretation of the law. Such actions will provide guidance to the
Secretary in enforcing the [Act] and to the mining industry and
miners in appreciating their responsibilities under the law.
When the Secretary and mine operators understand precisely
what the law expects of them, they can do what is necessary to

S. REP. No. 95-181, at 47 (1977), reprintedin 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401, 3446-47 and LEGISLATiVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL MNE SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1977, (1978), at 635 (prepared

for the Senate Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Human Resources, 95th Cong. 2d
Sess.) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF

1977].
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protect our Nation's miners and to improve
productivity in a
9
environment.
working
healthful
safe and
The independence of a body such as the Review Commission is in direct
conflict with the doctrine of judicial deference to administrative interpretations
of the statutes an agency enforces that is embodied in Chevron USA Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council 1 and the doctrine of deference to administrative interpretations of the regulations an agency promulgates that is embodied
in Bowles Price Administrator v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. I1The application
of these doctrines has resulted in an erosion of the independence of the Review
Commission.
This Article will discuss that conflict and examine the application of
these doctrines in the context of regulation under and enforcement of the 1977
Mine Act. It may also serve as a counterbalance for the opinions set out in the
article by W. Christian Schumann, the Department of Labor's Counsel for Appellate Litigation in the Mine Safety and Health Division, "The Allocation of
Authority Under the Mine Act: Is the Authority to Decide Questions
of Policy
12
Vested in the Secretary of Labor or in the Review Commission."'
The author here has represented mine operators and individuals subject
to the enforcement of the 1977 Mine Act before the Review Commission and its
administrative law judges as well as the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal
and views the deference doctrines from a different perspective than MSHA's
Counsel for Appellate Litigation. This Article will also suggest a different
model for reviewing MSHA's interpretations of the 1977 Mine Act and the
regulations developed under it and its predecessor, the 1969 Coal Act.
II.
A.

DEFERENCE TO AGENCIES' INTERPRETATIONS

Chevron Deference to Agencies' Interpretationsof Statutes

In 1984, the United States Supreme Court decided Chevron and altered
the concept of review of the interpretations by administrative agencies of the
laws they administer and, consequently, the regulations they promulgate. It "expanded the sphere of mandatory deference," made it "a ubiquitous formula goveming court-agency relations" and "effected a fundamental transformation
in
13
the relationship between courts and agencies under administrative law."'
Lastowka & Sapper, supra note 4, at 115-16 (quoting Hearingon the Nomination of Members of the FederalMine Safety and Health Review Commission before the Senate Committee on
Human Resources, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 1 (1978)).
9

10

467 U.S. 837 (1984).

11

325 U.S. 410 (1945).

12

Schumann, supra note 5.

13

Thomas W. Merrill & Kristen E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 833-34
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In Chevron, an environmental group sought the invalidation of a rule
promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency which embodied the
agency's interpretation of the Clean Air Act. 14 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 15 had overturned the regulation but the
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. It defined the issue in reviewing
the agency's interpretation of the statute as to whether the EPA had adopted a
"reasonable" interpretation of the Clean Air Act, stating:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First,
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agenc 's
the statute.
answer is based on a permissible construction of
The Court found that EPA's view was "permissible" because it was
"reasonable."' 17 The core assumptions in the Chevron decision were that interpretation of ambiguous statutes was a matter of policy, not law, and that Congress expressly or implicitly delegated to agencies the authority to make policy
decisions through interpretation.
The Court in Chevron set out a two-step process for courts to follow in
determining whether to defer to agency interpretations. First, a court must determine whether, using traditional tools of statutory construction, Congress had

(2001). For a contrasting view, see Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study
of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Court of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1998) suggesting

that Chevron changed little in how courts have decided cases.
14 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2000).
Nat. Res. Def Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom; Chevron
USA Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
16 Chevron USA Inc., v. Nat.Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43.
15

17

Id. at 845.

18 "The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created ... program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left,
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." Id.at 843 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231
(1974)).
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"directly addressed the precise question at issue." 19 If a court concludes that
Congress had a "specific intention" with respect to the issue, it is to adopt and
enforce that intention. The determination of whether Congress addressed the
issue before a court and its intent is clear based on a reading of the particular
statutory language, as well as "the language and design of the statute as a
whole," and the application of traditional tools of statutory construction. 21 If a
court fails to uncover Congress's intention, it must then determine
22 whether the
agency's position was "a reasonable interpretation" of the statute.
In Chevron, the United States Supreme Court appeared to resolve an inconsistency between
two lines of case law that one commentator had termed
"schizophrenic. ' 23 In one line of cases, a court could adopt the interpretation it
thought correct after giving the agency's interpretation "weight;" the degree of
that weight varied with such factors as the technical complexity of the issue, and
the agency's expertise. 24 For example, in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,25 the Court
stated that while the agency's interpretations were "not controlling," they did
"constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts ...
may properly resort for guidance."'26 "The weight" given to the agency's interpretation, would "depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and 27
later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it the power to persuade."
In the other line of cases, the Supreme Court held that "the reviewing
court's function is limited," and that it must accept an agency interpretation that
has "a reasonable basis in law." 28 Other cases in this line upheld the agency
interpretation "unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong. ' 29 Since
the criterion for interpretation under this line of cases was the reasonableness of
19

Id. at 845.

20

Id

21

Kmart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988).

22

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.

23

Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking In Re-

viewing Agency InterpretationsofStatutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 93 (1994).
24
See, e.g., United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571 (1981); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB,
330 U.S. 485, 492-93 (1947). See generally KENNETH CULp DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAWTREATISE § 3.1, at 108 (3d ed. 1994).
25
323 U.S. 134 (1944).
26

Id. at 140.

27

Id.

28

NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944).

29

Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969). See also Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co.,

90 F.3d 854, 859 (3d Cir. 1996).
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the agency's interpretation, not its correctness, it appeared to bar courts from
interpreting statutes de novo. The decision in Chevron followed this second line
of cases and has been "widely considered to be a watershed in the courts' review
said to have achieved
of statutory interpretation by agencies." 30 It has also been
31
deference.
about
statement"
the status of a "canonical
Until recently, the application of Chevron has been one of "steady expansion" at the urging of government lawyers. 32 In recent terms, however, the
Supreme Court appears to have retreated to some extent from the Chevron holding in deciding United States v. Mead Corp.33 and Christensen v. Harris
34

County.

In Christensen v. HarrisCounty, with virtually no discussion, the Court
found that an agency's interpretive letter did not warrant Chevron deference;
instead it was entitled to the respect described in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 35 In
Christensen, the Court indicated that interpretations of statutes made in noticeand-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication were entitled to Chevron deference, but interpretations contained in interpretive rules, policy statements,
agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines all were not. This case was followed in the next term by the decision in United States v. Mead that more directly addressed the reach of the Chevron decision.
The Court held that, while a ruling letter by the United States Customs
Service was not entitled to Chevron deference, it was entitled to Skidmore deference. At issue in Mead was a Customs' ruling letter on the tariff classification
for certain imported goods that was not a formal adjudication and that had not
been issued after notice-and-comment rulemaking. The Customs' ruling letter
decided what tariff was applicable to the items; it was a decision binding upon
both the agency and the importer of the particular goods, but not on third parties.
To resolve the case, the Court engaged in a discussion of the nature of
the Chevron doctrine. The Court said that the statute gives "no indication that
Congress meant to delegate authority to Customs to issue classification rulings
with the force of law.'36 Having found that Chevron did not apply, the Court
explained that Chevron had not eliminated the underpinnings for other forms of
30

Theodore L. Garrett, Judicial Review After Chevron: The Courts Reassert Their Role 10

NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T 59 (1995).
31 Merrill & Hickman, supra note 13, at 838.
One commentator described government attorneys as "relentlessly" pursuing the expansion
of Chevron. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 13, at 835. See also, Schumann, supra note 5, at
1099.
33 533 U.S. 218 (2001).

32

34

35

529 U.S. 576 (2000).
323 U.S. 134(1944). See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,256 (1991).

36

Mead, 533 U.S. at 231-32.
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deference, such as in Skidmore. The Court commented on the variety of types of
administrative authority and rejected an absolutist approach to deference:
Although we all accept the position that the Judiciary should defer to at least some of this multifarious administrative action,
we have to decide how to take account of the great range of its
variety. If the primary objective is to simplify the judicial process of giving or withholding deference, then the diversity of
statutes authorizing discretionary administrative action must be
declared irrelevant or minimized. If, on the other hand, it is
simply implausible that Congress intended such a broad range
of statutory authority to produce only two varieties of administrative action, demanding either Chevron deference or none at
all, then the breadth of the spectrum of possible agency action
must be taken into account. Justice Scalia's first priority over
the years has been to limit and simplify. The Court's choice has
been to tailor deference to variety. This acceptance of the range
of statutory variation has led the Court to recognize more than
one variety of judicial deference, just as the Court has recognized a variety37of indicators that Congress would expect Chevron deference.

Because neither of the lower courts had considered the effect of Skidmore on
the case, the Court remanded the case for them to apply it in the first instance.
Justice Scalia dissented, stating that the decision made "an avulsive
change in judicial review of federal administrative action" and suggested the
Court would be sorting out the consequences of the decision "for years to
come. '38 While the change may not be this dramatic, the Mead decision does, in
fact, suggest that the Court is retreating from the absolutist approach of Chevron
and resurrecting Skidmore as a useful viable alternative.
B.

Deference to Agencies' InterpretationsofRegulations

Chevron addressed interpretations by an agency of a statute that it is
charged with enforcing and not the interpretation of regulations promulgated by
that agency. The Supreme Court had, prior to Chevron, articulated what appeared to be a different test for deference to agency interpretations of regulations.
In Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., the Court stated that it owed an

agency's interpretation of its own regulation "controlling weight unless it is
37

Id. at 236-37 (footnotes omitted).

38

Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." 39 This had been read to
mean that
prevails so long as it is "reasonable," in
• the
•• agency's interpretation
40
..
is logical in that many agency reguThis
approach
to
Chevron.
similar fashion
41
provisions.
statutory
on
based
are
lations
In a case involving a use of the split-enforcement model, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 ("OSH Act"), 42 the Supreme Court applied
such a deferential approach to a conflict between the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration ("OSHA") and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission ("OSH Review Commission"). 43 There the Court was confronted with two possible interpretations of a regulation that the Secretary of
Labor had promulgated under the OSH Act. The Court of Appeals had deferred
to the interpretation of the OSH Review Commission. 44 The Supreme Court
reversed:
It is well established "that an agency's construction of its own
regulations is entitled to substantial deference .. " In situations
in which "the meaning of [regulatory] language is not free from
doubt," the reviewing court should give effect to the agency's
interpretation so long as it is "reasonable..." that is, so long as
the interpretation "sensibly conforms to the purpose and wording of the regulations.. . ." Because applying an agency's regulation to complex or changing circumstances calls upon the
agency's unique expertise and policymaking prerogatives, we
presume that the power authoritatively to interpret its own regu-

39

325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).

40

See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (giving "controlling

weight" to agency's interpretation); Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 94-95 (1995)
("It is a reasonable regulatory interpretation and we must defer to it."); see also Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d 579, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Some commentators have suggested that a different standard of deference exists for interpretations of regulations as applied to
statutes. See Robert A. Anthony & Michael Asimow, The Court's Differences - A Foolish Inconsistency, 26 ADMiN. & REG. L. NEWS 10 (2000). If this is correct, it would appear that the Supreme Court is evolving away from separate doctrines or that the doctrines are so similar they
cannot be distinguished.
41

This is especially true of the 1977 Mine Act. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 841-878 (2000) (interim
mandatory regulations set out in the statute and later adopted as regulations in 30 C.F.R. § 75
(2001)).

42

29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000).

43

Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991).

44

Id. at 149-50.
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lations is a component of the agency's delegated lawmaking
45
powers.
The Court held that the OSH Review Commissionpossessed no more
power other than to perform a role as a neutral arbritator. 46 But it did specifically limit its holding:
We emphasize the narrowness of our holding. We deal in this
case only with the division of powers between the Secretary and
the Commission under the OSH Act. We conclude from the
available indicia of legislative intent that Congress did not intend to sever the power authoritatively to interpret OSH Act
regulations from the Secretary's power to promulgate and enforce them. Subject only to constitutional limits, Congress is
free, of course, to divide these powers as it chooses, and we
take no position on the division of enforcement and interpretive
schemes that conform to the
powers within other regulatory
47
split-enforcement structure.
This limitation appears to leave open how the principle of deference to an
agency's interpretations of its regulations will be applied to MSHA and the
Review Commission to the extent that the OSH Act and the 1977 Mine Act
are different. 48 When read in conjunction with Christenson's and Mead's
restrictions on the application of Chevron deference to less formal interpretations, such as would be in MSHA's Program Policy Manual, its Program
Policy Letters Compliance Guides, citations or litigation documents, it
would appear that this area of deference may be subject to reevaluation also.

45

Id. at 150-51 (quoting Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986); Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566, 568 (1980); N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Porter County Chapter of
Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc., 423 U.S. 12, 15 (1975); Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99,
105, (1971); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965)).
46
Id. at 155 (quoting Cuyahoga Valley Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 474 U.S. 3, 7

(1985)).
47
Id. at 157-58.
48 The Court did not discuss the portions of the legislative history of the OSH Act that would
have called into question its ruling as to the scope of the OSH Review Commission's authority.
See Lastowka & Sapper, supra note 4, at 109. The OSH Review Commission has narrowly applied this decision, holding that it did not require deference if the Commission was interpreting the
OSH Act, as opposed to regulations. Sec'y of Labor v. Arcadian Corp., 17 O.Sh. Cas. (BNA)
1345, 1360-61 (Apr. 27, 1995), affd on other grounds, 110 F.3d 1192 (5th Cir. 1997). But see
Herman v. Tidewater Pac. Inc., 160 F.3d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998) (extending Martin to statutory interpretations).
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A.

197

1977 MINE ACT

Case Law Development

When Congress created the Review Commission in the 1977 Mine Act,
they made it an agency wholly independent of MSHA. Congress addressed the
amount of consideration that the Review Commission should give to MSHA's
statutory and regulatory interpretations:
Since the Secretary of Labor is charged with responsibility for
implementing this Act, it is the intention of the Committee, consistent with generally accepted precedent, that the Secretary's
interpretations of the law and regulations
shall be given weight
49
courts.
the
and
Commission
the
by both
The language in the legislative history in reference to "weight" according to MSHA's interpretations appears to mimic that of Skidmore, but not the
"controlling" language of Bowles v. Seminole Rock or the subsequent absolutist
approach of Chevron. This would suggest that Congress intended a different
model than the absolutist one set out in those cases. The Review Commission's
early decisions followed this approach, holding that MSHA's interpretations
were not entitled to "controlling weight," i.e., the sort of deference the Courts
have given in Chevron and Bowles.
In Old Ben Coal Co., the Commission was addressing the issue of
whether the operator of a mine could be cited for a violation caused by its independent contractor. MSHA argued that the Review Commission had no authority to review its decision to cite the operator instead of the contractor. The
Commission made it clear that it had an independent role in reviewing MSHA's
actions:
Second, we reject the Secretary's attempt to equate the Commission with a court of appeals and have the judicial review
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, including 5
U.S.C. § 701, applied to Commission proceedings by analogy.
The Commission stands in a fundamentally different position in
relation to the Secretary than does a court of appeals. The
Commission was established as the "ultimate administrative review body" under the Act due to the recognition that "an independent Commission is essential to provide administrative adS. REP. No. 95-181, at 49, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401, 3448 and LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1977, supranote 8, at 635.
50
1 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1480, 1483-1485 (1979), aff'd on other grounds, No. 79-2367 (D.C. Cir.
49

1980).
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judication which preserves due
process and instills much more
51
confidence in the program.
In Helen Mining Co.,52 the Review Commission was again asked to defer to MSHA's interpretation of the 1977 Mine Act which was contained in the
Federal Register. Again, the Commission asserted its independence:
We examine at the outset the Secretary's objection that Judge
Merlin failed to accord "proper deference" to MSHA's interpretative bulletin. The Secretary relies primarily on Certified Color
ManufacturersAss'n v. Mathews, 543 F.2d 284, 294 (D.C. Cir.

1974), where the court stated that "review is guided by the considerable deference traditionally owed the interpretation of a
statute by the head of the agency charged with its administration", and NYS Department of Social Services v. Dublino, 413

U.S. 405 (1973), where the Supreme Court observed that "the
construction of a statute by those charged with its execution
should be followed unless there are compelling indications that
it is wrong ......
The difficulties with the Secretary's argument are that it ignores
the language and structure of the 1977 Act, that it fails to recognize the proper roles of the Commission and the Secretary,
and that it would, if adopted, frustrate the purposes for which
Congress established the Commission as a wholly independent
agency. Under the Secretary's view, the Commission could not
study a problem afresh and make an independent judgment on
matters of law and policy. Its task would be little more than to
find the facts, accord considerable deference to the Secretary's
position, and determine whether there are compelling indications that his construction of the 1977 Act is wrong. Congress,
however, invested the Commission with the authority to decide
questions of both law and policy (sections 113(d)(2)(A)(ii) and
and it intended that the Commission do so independ(d)(2)(B)),
53
ently.
51

Id. at

1484. See also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT

OF 1977, supra note 8, at 635.
52
1 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1796, 1799 (1979), rev'don other grounds sub nom. United Mine Workers
ofAm. v, F.M.S.H.R.C., 671 F.2d 615, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
53

Id. at 1798-99 (quoting NYS Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973); Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969); and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 481-482
(1970)). On appeal, the majority did not resolve the issue of deference but the dissent discussed
the issue at some length. United Mine Workers of Am. v. F.M.S.H.R.C. (Helen Mining Co.), 671

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol107/iss1/8

12

Moore: The Doctrine of Judicial Deference and the Independence of the Fe
2004]

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

199

But, these decisions predate the decision in Chevron, although not that in
Seminole Rock.
The Review Commission also had, for a number of years, held that
MSHA's policies and guidelines were not binding upon it.54 This would, of
course, suggest that the Review Commission was still free to make its own
evaluations of the merits of a particular interpretation or a particular policy. As
recently as 1992, the Review Commission reiterated its assertion of independence, distinguishing the Supreme Court's
decision in Martin v. OSHRC and
55
jurisdiction.
policy
own
its
asserting
But not long after that, the Commission began to withdraw from this
position. In 1994, it held that it had independent general policy authority 56 but it
also had held previously that its job was not to determine if MSHA's interpretation was correct but simply to determine if MSHA's interpretation was "reason, 57
able."
This change in position was solidified after the decision in Energy West
Mining Co. v. F.MS.H.R.C.58 by the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. There, the Review Commission had determined
that MSHA's interpretation of its own regulations on accident reporting was
"reasonable" 59 and, despite the fact that the regulation required the reporting of
non-work related injuries on mine property and was not necessarily the best
method of tracking work-related injuries, it upheld the regulation. The Court
of Appeals then upheld MSHA's interpretation and addressed the issue of the
standard of review by the Review Commission of MSHA's interpretation. It
held that the Commission was simply to determine if MSHA's interpretation
61
was "reasonable" i.e., the Chevron standard.
The Commission has continued its retreat from a position as an independent reviewing body in the face of other decisions by the United States Court
of Appeals that where MSHA and the Review Commission are in conflict, the

F.2d at 622-23 & n.26. The dissent indicated that the policy authority of the Review Commission
suggested its interpretations should be accorded weight even if it disagreed with MSHA. Id. at 635

(Tamm, J., dissenting).
54

See, e.g., King Knob Coal Co., 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1417, 1419 (1981).

55

Drummond Co., Inc., 14 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 675 n. 15.
W-P Coal Co., 16 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1407, 1410 (1994).

56

57
58

Consolidation Coal Co., 14 F.M.S.H.R.C. 956 (1992).
40 F.3d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

59

Energy W. Mining Co., 15 F.M.S.H.R.C. 587, 593 (1993), aff'd 40 F.3d 457 (D.C. Cir.

1994).
60

Id.

61

Energy W Mining Co., 40 F.3d at 462.
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Review Commission must defer to MSHA. 62 Perhaps the most extreme extension of the doctrine in these cases occurred in Secretary ofLabor obo Wamsley
v. Mutual Mining Inc.,63 where MSHA sought deference to its position that unemployment compensation benefits should not be deducted from backpay
awards to miners when received under the discrimination provision under Section 105(c) of the 1977 Mine Act. The evaluation of judicial-style remedies for
discrimination would appear to be logically within the province of the agency
with adjudication responsibility, just as the imposition of civil penalties are
within the expertise of the Review Commission. The Review Commission's65
administrative law judge had ruled, based on Review Commission precedent,
that such benefits were deductible. This ruling was based, in part, on the Review
Commission's authority under6 6the 1977 Mine Act to decide what relief is appropriate in discrimination cases.
Despite this statutory delegation of authority, the Court of Appeals deferred to the Secretary's "interpretation." The Court relied upon the fact that the
Secretary was given rulemaking authority under the 1977 Mine Act, although
MSHA had promulgated no rules on the issue of back pay or even civil penalties
in discrimination suits. 67 But even if it had, the Commission assesses penalties
de novo despite MSHA civil penalty regulations and was clearly viewed by
Congress as having the ability to freely adjudicate remedies. The Court also
relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Martin v. OSHRC69 to support its
70
decision.
62

Sec'y of Labor obo Wamsley v. Mut. Mining, Inc., 80 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 1996); Joy Tech,

Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, 99 F.3d 991, 995 (10th Cir. 1996). See also Sec'y of Labor obo Bushnell v.
Cannelton Indus., Inc., 867 F.2d 1432, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Brock obo Williams v. Peabody
Coal Co., 822 F.2d 1134, 1146 & n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co.,
796 F.2d 533, 537 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Donovan v. Carolina Stalite Co., 734 F.2d 1547, 1552
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
80 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 1996).
63
64

30 U.S.C. § 820(k) (2000) (stating that no contested penalty shall be compromised, mitigated or settled without approval of Commission); see also Sellersburg Stone Co., 5 F.M.S.H.R.C.
287, 290 (1983), affd 736 F.2d 1147, 1153 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that penalties will be assessed
de novo by the Review Commission).
Meek v. Essroc Corp., 15 F.M.S.H.R.C. 606, 617-18 (1993).
65

66

30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2) (2000).

67

Cf Reich v. Arcadian Corp., 110 F.3d 1192, 1199 (5th Cir. 1997) (declining to accept

OSHA's interpretation of penalty provisions).
68 See 30 U.S.C. § 820(k) (2000); Sellersburg Stone Co., 5 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 290; 30 C.F.R. §
100 (2001).
69 499 U.S. 144 (1991).
70

Sec'y of Labor obo Wamsley v. Mut. Mining Inc., v. 80 F.3d 110, 114. As discussed below,

that decision is distinguishable because of the different language in the OSH Act. See United
Mine Workers of Am. v. F.M.S.H.R.C., 671 F.2d 615, 635 (1982) (Tamm, J., dissenting); Drum-
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The Review Commission generally has now come to follow the application of Chevron deference with respect to both statutory and regulatory interpretation. 71 There have been occasions, however, when various Commission members have set forth a position which does not accept an absolutist Chevron deference, but such instances have been relatively rare.72
Recently, one member questioned the application of the deference doctrines to the Review Commission. In a case where the Review Commission's73
administrative law judge squarely confronted the issue and rejected deference,
one Commissioner, in dissent also adopted such approach:
I believe that the reasoning set forth in Helen Mining is as valid
today as when written, and was not superseded by Chevron
when that decision was handed down in 1984. Chevron deference principles were tailored by the Supreme Court for other
federal courts of general jurisdiction. The Chevron decision itself drives this point home, a decision in which the federal
courts were faced with the task of reviewing a highly complex
regulatory program promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency.... In Chevron, the Court recognized that the federal courts must not become mired in detailed review of such
programs....
The Commission, however, is not a federal court of general jurisdiction, as the judge correctly pointed out. Under the plain
terms of the Mine Act, the Commission is a specialized body,
30 U.S.C. § 823(a), charged by Congress with the specialized
tasks of "assessing civil penalties for violations of safety and
health standards, [of] reviewing the enforcement activities of
the Secretary of Labor, and [of] protecting miners against
unlawful discrimination." Nomination Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Human Resources, 95th Cong. at 1 (1978). It
is at the very heart of our statutorily mandated purpose to con-

mond Co., Inc., 14 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 675 & n.15; Ferrara, supra note 4, at 6.07-.08.
71

Berwind Nat Res. Corp., 21 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1284, 1306 (1999); Island Creek Coal Co., 20
F.M.S.H.R.C. 14, 18-19 (1998); Thunder Basin Coal Co., 18 F.M.S.H.R.C. 582, 584 (1996);
Keystone Coal Mining Corp., 16 F.M.S.H.R.C. 6, 13 (1994).
72
See, e.g., Amax Coal Co., 18 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1355, 1363 (1996) (Holen and Riley, J.J. con-

curring) (holding that "sweeping concept of deference" cannot be reconciled with the Supreme
Court decision in Thunder Basin v. Reich).
73
Cyprus Cumberland Res. Corp., 20 F.M.S.H.R.C. 285 (1998), rev'd 21 F.M.S.H.R.C. 722,

729 (1999).
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cem ourselves with detailed review of the Secretary's
programs,
74
and even more so, interpreting the Mine Act.

B.

Application of the Deference Doctrines Ignores the Language and
Structure of the 1977 Mine Act

There are a number of problems with the reasoning that has resulted in
an absolutist approach to deference under the 1977 Mine Act. It ignores the
unique nature of the Commission under the Mine Act. It ignores the policymaking authority of the Review Commission and the Supreme Court's recognition of that policy-making authority and the Review Commission's independent
status.
The 1977 Mine Act confers a policy role on the Review Commission,
which is inconsistent with deference to MSHA under the Chevron model of deference based on the theory of delegation of policy making authority to an
agency. Section 113(d)(2) of the 1977 Mine Act states several times that the
Review Commission is to review questions of "Commission policy" and "novel
questions of policy," as well as questions of "law."'75 Congress even authorized
76
the Review Commission to review cases when no party has sought review.
The legislative background and history of the 1977 Mine Act confirm
the implication that Congress did not expect the Review Commission to simply
be a neutral arbitrator of facts. The 1969 Coal Act had given all administrative
functions to the Secretary of the Interior, who had established an enforcement
arm, the Mining Enforcement Safety Administration, and an adjudication arm,
the Interior Board of Mine Operations Appeals which acted independently and
did not defer to the enforcement arm. 77 When amendment of the 1969 Coal Act
was considered in 1977, the House and Senate approached it differently, with
the House passing a bill where all the functions were contained within the Department of Labor and the Senate adopting a split enforcement approach. 78 The
House, in fact, rejected a proposal to establish an independent body with policy-

Cyprus Cumberland Res. Corp., 21 F.M.S.H.R.C. 722, 737 (1999) (Verheggen, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Helen Mining Co., 1 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1796, 1801 ("Resolution of... questions [of statutory interpretation] is a primary role of the Commission."). In addition to the Judge
in Cyprus Cumberland Resources, at least one of the Commission's administrative law judges has
questioned the rote application of the doctrine. See, e.g., Tilden Mining Co. L.C., 24 F.M.S.H.R.C.
53 (2002).
74

75
76
77
78

30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(2)(B) (2000).
ld.
See Lastowka & Sapper, supra note 4, at 113.
Id. at 113 -14.
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Senate version was accepted in conference by both
review authority. 79 8The
0
Houses of Congress.
As discussed earlier, the Senate committee stated the reasons for the establishment of an independent review body - "an independent Commission is
essential to provide administrative adjudication 81which preserves due process and
instills much more confidence in the program.
The Supreme Court evaluated the role of the Commission in Thunder
Basin Coal Co. v. Reich.

Thunder Basin involved an attempt by the United

Mine Workers of America ("UMWA") to designate two of its miners who did
not work for a mine operator, to serve as miners' representatives under Section
103(f) of the 1977 Mine Act. 83 This was permissible under MSHA's regulations. 84 Such representatives exercise certain rights, including the right to accompany inspectors and to point out safety violations. 85 The UMWA was engaged in organizing efforts in the area. Thunder Basin sought an injunction barring MSHA's enforcement of the regulations concerning such representatives,
and the Supreme Court was asked to rule on the issue of whether Thunder Basin
could bring suit outside the Review Commission process.
In rejecting Thunder Basin's position that it need not accept a citation to
challenge MSHA's position, the Court found that the Commission was "established as an independent-review body to 'develop a uniform and comprehensive
interpretation' of the Mine Act," 86 cited Congress's authorization to the Commission to review policy questions, 87 and stated that the Commission could
bring its expertise to bear on statutory questions under the 1977 Mine Act. 88 It
even held that the Commission, unlike the typical administrative agency, was
89
uniquely situated to adjudicate the constitutionality of its enabling legislation.
79

H.R. 4287, 95th Cong. § 114, at 55-60 (1977) (as introduced), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1977 at 188, 242-47.
80
S. REP. No. 95-461, at 60-61 (1977), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1977 at 1279, 1338-1339.

81
82

S. REP. NO. 95-181, at 47 (1977), reprintedin 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401, 3446-3447.
510 U.S. 200, 209-11 (1994).

83

30 U.S.C. § 813(0 (2000).

84

Utah Power & Light Co. v. Sec'y, 897 F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 1990); 30 C.F.R. § 40.1 (2001).

See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 813(f-g) (2000); Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. F.M.S.H.R.C., 56 F.3d
1275, 1278 (10th Cir. 1995); Utah Power & Light Co., 897 F.2d at 447.
86 Id. at 214 (quoting Senator Williams' remarks at the nomination hearings).
85

87

Thunder Basin Coal Co., 510 U.S. at 208 & n.9.

8

Id. at 214-15.
Id. at 215.

89
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Thunder Basin appeared to presage91the end of Chevron-style deference under
90
the 1977 Mine Act. But it did not.
The Court of Appeals and the Review Commission have ignored Thunv. OSHRC.92
der Basin in favor of the decision under the OSH Act in Martin
But that ruling may not be automatically transferable to the Commission because the OSH Act does 93not expressly grant any comparable policy jurisdiction
to the OSH Commission.
Judge Tamm in his dissent in UnitedMine Workers v. FMSHRC94 noted
the inapplicability of decisions under the OSH Act to situations under the 1977
Mine Act:
The Congress clearly divided the lawmaking and policymaking
functions between the Secretary of Labor and the Commission,
and it is apparent that some deference is owed a decision of the
Commission even when it diverges from the position of the Secretary. The analogy noted by the Commission between the policymaking structure under the FMSA and that under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) is distinct, and cases articulating the relationship between the Secretary of Labor and
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission are
accordingly apposite in the FMSA context. The Commission
concluded that the Secretary's views were to be accorded "special weight," and that standard seems about right, albeit a bit
amorphous. The critical point, however, is that the Commission's construction of its governing statute must be accorded
some weight, even when its position differs from that of the
Secretary's; otherwise, the Commission would be "little more
than a specialized jury, an agency charged only with fact finding." I believe that Congress intended a more active role for the
95
Commission.

90

The Review Commission's then-General Counsel L. Joseph Ferrara argued that Thunder

Basin supported an independent role for the Review Commission. Ferrara, supra note 4, at 6.07.
See also 1 MiNE SAFETY AND HEALTH NEws 240 (May 20, 1994) (Interview of the commission

chairman).
91 See Southwest Gas Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 40 F.3d 464 (1994).
92 499 U.S. 144 (1991).
93

Id. at 152-56.

94

671 F.2d 615, 627 (1982).

95

Id. at 635 (footnotes omitted).
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Judge Tamm's discussion of the issues is, of course, consistent with the
of the "multifarious administrative action" in
Supreme Court's recognition
96
UnitedStates v. Mead Corp.
C.

The Problems with Deference Under the 1977 Mine Act
1.

Concerns About Deference Generally

There are a myriad of problems with the application of the deference
doctrines generally that have been discussed and commented upon at length. For
example, there are several other important conceptual and constitutional issues
raised by Chevron and Bowles v. Seminole Rock. One is the extent to which the
Chevron approach is consistent with the premise of Marbury v. Madison97 that
the courts have the primary role in interpreting statutes. One may also question
the implicit assumption in Chevron that Congress has unfettered authority to
require the courts to defer to and enforce an agency's view of the statute, a concept with separation-of-powers implications.
Chevron raises fundamental issues as to the balance of power among the
three branches of government. The fact that a statute is ambiguous does not necessarily mean that there is no role for a court in reviewing the statute and legislative history to determine whether the agency's action is contrary to the intent
of Congress. While Chevron assumes that policy issues should be left to elected
officials, 99 it is arguable that modem administrative agencies are subject to effective controls by either the President or Congess. Presidential administrations
come and go while agency employees do not. By tilting so heavily in favor of
deference to the administrative agencies, Chevron may fail to provide needed
safeguards against agency abuses of power and, in the process, may denigrate
01
the role of both the judicial and the legislative branches of government.1
The use of the absolutist doctrines of Chevron or Bowles ignores the
fundamental nature of administrative agencies. They are not unbiased impartial
96

533 U.S. 218, 236 (2001).

97
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The JudicialPerspective in the
Administrative State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines ofDeference with the Judiciary's Structural
Role, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1 (2000); Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 363 (1986).

98
See Anthony & Asimow, supra note 40, at 10-11. But see Merrill & Hickman, supra note
13, at 864 (suggesting Chevron rests on the separation of powers doctrine).
99

See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.

100 But see Merrill & Hickman, supra note 13, at 861. The authors asserted that agencies are

more politically accountable than the courts. This is arguable since the decisions of lower court
judges are held up to the scrutiny of higher courts while agencies' actions increasingly are not.
Agencies, however, are far less accountable than the Congress or a presidential administration.
101 See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 13, at 866.
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arbiters. They are advocates, and they seek to expand their own authority and
responsibility on a continual basis. This is especially true of the agencies, such
as MSHA, which have a relatively narrow scope of regulation.
Judge Weis of the Third Circuit commented upon the bias inherent in
the regulatory process:
Nor is the Director a completely objective interpreter of the
regulation. His role is multi-faceted - he must draft regulations,
apply them to individuals, and as their opponent, defend his
construction on appeal. The bias of his position must be placed
on the scales, as would that of any other litigant.
Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland is a frequently cited
source of authority on and about the judicial process, an association with tempting opportunities for digression that I shall resist here. But the Director's position is similar to that of Alice's
friend:
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather
scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean -- neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make
words mean so many different things."
Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be
"The question is," ' said
10 2
master -- that's all."
In an interview with Judge A. Raymond Randolph of the District of Coof Appeals, 103 the Judge 10 questioned the wideCircuit
the Courtdoctrines:
lumbia
spread use of theofdeference
To me, the abiding principle for American democracy and
American law is that no government official, under any circumstances, in any place, always has unfettered discretion to do
whatever he wants. Everybody operates under some constraints.
Administrative agencies are therefore constrained. And the role
of the courts is to make sure the agencies keep within proper
bounds. This is where you begin to get into some controversy,
102

Dep't of Labor v. Mangifest, 826 F.2d 1318, 1334 (3d Cir. 1987) (Weis, J., concurring)

(quoting L. CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES INWONDERLAND (1865)).
103 Jeffrey Cole, An Interview with Judge Randolph, 25 LmO. 50 (1999).
104

Judge Rudolph was appointed in 1990 by President George H.W. Bush.
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at least in my mind, because the effectiveness of the judicial
check is dependent upon such things as theories of statutory interpretation.
For example, there is the idea that we ought to defer to administrative agencies in a very broad range. To the extent we do, the
judicial check on agency action is weakened. And to that extent,
it seems to me, we are antidemocratic. It is true that the agencies may be policy-making bodies while the courts generally are
not, but the ultimate policy-making body is the one that's responsive to the electorate, which is Congress.
And so we get cases that make me wonder about the way the
system is moving. To give you a non-specific example, take a
case where an administrative agency has to interpret a statute.
And what you see is the work of what appears to be a young
lawyer on the staff, who has read the legislative history, analyzed committee reports, and perhaps looked at some letters
congressmen sent - although they are not in the record. A conclusion is then reached by this lawyer about what a particular
phrase or statute means, and that becomes adopted by the
agency as part of a particular regulation or in some adjudication.
Then it comes before us, and we are told that maybe we
shouldn't even look at the legislative history or we're told that
we have to defer to the administrative agency's interpretation.
Frankly, I'm troubled by this. I think that after some period of
time the judges on our court are probably far more expert in interpreting statutes than a particular staffer for an administrative
agency. And besides, that's what we're supposed to be doing.
That's what federal courts are for. So I wonder whether we have
gone far too far in terms of the principle of deference to the
agencies. In my judgment, fidelity to our office does not require
deference to a particular construction of a statute merely because it comes from an administrative agency.
Another problem is that agencies often reach an interpretation
without articulating any basis for it at all. In fact, they don't
even know they reached an interpretation. They just assume
something in terms of writing an adjudication with an adjudicatory response to a particular problem or promulgating a regulation. There is no rule that requires any kind of long explanation
of why or how a particular result was reached.
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To my mind, uncritical
deference poses a danger to the democ05
ratic system. 1

The application of a deference standard essentially authorizes agencies
to make law through policy and guidelines without resort to notice and comment

rulemaking. °6 Deference may well be in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act's direction 107 that a reviewing court shall determine the meaning and

applicability of agency action. 10 8 It creates a powerful incentive for an agency to
issue vague regulations. 109 The doctrines permit an agency to create, in effect,110a
new regulation by simply reinterpreting a vague or general regulation.

Whether intentional or not, agencies are encouraged by the doctrines to promulgate vague, general regulations, regulatory "mush" in one court's view, since
there will be limited review of what they decide is a proper "interpretation."
2.

Concerns About Deference to MSHA

The problems are compounded under the 1977 Mine Act and many of

the hypothetical concerns of commentators are, in fact, present in the MSHA
context. MSHA has been as aggressive as any agency in trying to extend the
scope of the application of the deference doctrine before the Commission. For
example, an agency's jurisdiction is one of the areas where deference is not necessarily considered appropriate. 112 On any number of occasions, MSHA has

105

Cole, supra note 103, at 53-54 (emphasis added).

106

Anthony & Asimow, supra note 40, at 21.

107

5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).

108

Anthony & Asimow, supra note 40, at 10-11; Lastowka & Sapper, supra note 4, at 125-26;

Merrill & Hickman, supra note 13, at 900.
109
Anthony & Asimow, supra note 40, at 11; Molot, supra note 97, at 105-07. One Court
described this as creating "perverse incentives for an agency to draft vague regulations that give
inadequate guidance." Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 584 (D.C.
Cir. 1997).
110
Anthony & Asimow, supra note 40, at 11; John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and
Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 612, 670
(1996).
lt
Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 584.
112

See Miss. Power and Light Co. v. Miss. ex. rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 386-87 (1988) (Bren-

nan, J., dissenting); Lancashire Coal Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 968 F.2d 388, 392-93 & n.4 (3d Cir.
1992); Air Courier Conference of Am/Int'l Comm. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 959 F.2d 1213, 1223 (3d
Cir. 1992); Id. at 1226 (Becker, J., concurring); Otis Elevator v. Sec'y of Labor, 921 F.2d 1285,
1288 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See also Merrill & Hickman, supra note 13, at 909-10.
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sought to expand its jurisdiction into areas which arguably are not within its
113
scope.
MSHA has also gone so far as to pursue deference in areas that are
clearly within an adjudicator's scope of responsibility. It has argued that the
Commission should defer to its concept of remedies under the antidiscrimination provisions of the 1977 Mine Act. 114 It has argued that the Review
Commission should defer to its interpretation of what is an "agent" under the
1977 Mine Act under a multi-factor test developed by the Commission, 115 seeking, in effect, to take over the adjudicative function of applying the Commission's test.
a.

There Needs to be an Adequate Check on MSHA's
Authority

MSHA has extraordinary enforcement authority. It is usually exercised,
not at an upper level of the agency, but at the inspector level. 116 An individual
inspector has authority to issue immediately effective orders requiring the withdrawal of miners from an area or a whole mine when certain preconditions are
met, such as the perception by an individual inspector that an imminent danger
exists, 11 7 a failure to abate a previously cited condition exists, 118 or when certain
other 9events have occurred, including some where no significant hazard ex11
ists.
11 See, e.g., Herman v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc., 172 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 1999) (concerning electric generating station); Lancashire Coal Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 968 F.2d 388 (3d Cir.
1992) (concerning demolition project); Paul v. F.M.S.H.R.C., 812 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(concerning offsite engineering offices); Old Dominion Power Co. v. Donovan, 772 F.2d 92, 93
(4th Cir. 1985) (concerning electrical substation); Kinder Morgan Operating L.P.C., 23
F.M.S.H.R.C. 1288 (2001) (concerning marine terminal); RNS Servs., Inc., 18 F.M.S.H.R.C. 523,
529 (1996), aff'd 115 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 1997) (concerning abandoned coal refuse pile); Air Prods.
& Chems., Inc., 15 F.M.S.H.R.C. 2428 (1993) (concerning electric cogeneration facility); see
generally Thomas C. Means, When is a Non-Mine Mine a "Mine?" The Riddle of MSHA 's Assertion ofJurisdictionover ElectricPower Plants and Other Coal Users, 20 ENERGY & MIN. L. INST.

131 (2000).
114 Sec'y of Labor obo Wamsley v. Mut. Mining., Inc., 80 F.3d 110, 115 (4th Cir. 1996).
"15

Martin Marietta Assoc., 22 F.M.S.H.R.C. 633, 637 (2000).

116 A citation which changes a longstanding enforcement practice may be the product of the

"thought processes of one individual" and may be contrary to MSHA's longstanding practice and
MSHA may still adopt it in litigation. Tilden Mining Co. L.C., 24 F.M.S.H.R.C. 53, 61 (2002).
The inspector there was not even following MSHA's guide to equipment guarding. The inspector's position was "not in harmony with MSHA's long-standing agency practice." Id.
117 30 U.S.C. § 817(a) (2000).
118 30 U.S.C. § 814(b) (2000).
19 30 U.S.C. § 814(d)(1) and (d)(2) (2000). By way of contrast, OSHA inspectors exercise no
such authority. Individual OSHA inspectors do not issue citations and OSHA has no withdrawal
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Citations, which do not require the immediate withdrawal of miners, are
based only upon an inspector's "belief' that a violation occurred. 12 Abatement
of such citations is required long before any review of the enforcement action
can realistically take place. Even an expedited hearing before an administrative
judge of the Review Commission requires four-day notice to MSHA. 21 Temporary relief is only available on a 122
limited basis and is not available for citations,
as opposed to withdrawal orders.
In addition, MSHA's inspectors' presence at mines, especially underFour inspections of underground mines and
ground coal mines, is constant.
two of surface are required each year, and such inspections usually involve multiple days. 124 Frequent spot inspections also occur. 125 There are no search war126
rant requirements that apply to mines.
The omnipresent nature of MSHA's inspections and the potential for
immediate order of cessation of operation require a different perspective from a
reviewing tribunal, not only to properly afford due process but also to prevent
the perception of arbitrariness from developing. If a regulatory system is perceived as arbitrary and unfair, it loses its effectiveness. Unless effective review
of the agency's actions is provided, the perception that the regulatory system is
unfair and arbitrary cannot be avoided. The use of the doctrines of deference
makes it appear that the system is arbitrary and undermines the goal of protecting miners. If the system is arbitrary, it undermines voluntary compliance which
is essential to achieving the 1977 Mine Act's goals because even if inspectors
are at a mine every day, they cannot watch every miner and every supervisor.
When the OSH Act was passed, there was a concern about concentrating powers within one agency. 127 Senator Jacob Javits, another one of the architects of the OSH Act, noted that:
order authority. An employer can stay abatement of any citation if it contests it. See MARK A.
ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW §§ 251, 292, 318 (1998).
120
30 U.S.C. § 814(a) (2000).
121

29 C.F.R. § 2700.52(b) (2001).

122

29 C.F.R. § 2700.46(a) (2001).

123

See, e.g., Cyprus Cumberland Res., Corp., 20 F.M.S.H.R.C. 285 (1998), rev'd 21

F.M.S.H.R.C. 722 (1999) (stating that in a 90-day period MSHA inspectors traveled the main
haulage at this underground mine over 200 times). MSHA routinely spends 2000 inspection hours
at underground coal mines as shown by a compilation it develops each year called "National-500
Mines with Most 104(a) S&S Citations" which includes on-site inspection hours.
124
Id; 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (2000).
125

30 U.S.C. § 813(i) (2000).

126

Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981). Cf Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307

(1978) (stating that search warrant required under OSH Act).
127
Johnson, supra note 5, at 318.
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Hearing and determination of enforcement cases by an independent panel more closely accords with traditional notions of
due process.128
A similar concern also exists with respect to MSHA except there is
greater cause for it. MSHA has far more enforcement powers than OSHA and
actually inspects all worksites. The additional enhancement of the authority in
this one agency that is permitted by the deference doctrines creates a great potential for arbitrariness and unfairness.
b.

The GeneralNature of MSHA 's Regulations and
MSHA's InconsistentEnforcement Require Independent
Review

In addition to the omnipresence of the inspection force and MSHA's extraordinary enforcement authority, there are difficulties created by the vagueness
of the regulations MSHA has promulgated and how MSHA enforces them, especially the inconsistency of MSHA's interpretations that suggest that an absolutist approach is not appropriate.
Many of the regulations MSHA has promulgated are vague and general.
A number of commentators have expressed concern that applications of deference permit an agency to misuse its rulemaking authority by promulgating
vague regulations that it then interprets. 12 9 This concern is very realistic when
MSHA's regulations are considered.
For example, MSHA has regulations that require identification of "hazardous" conditions, 130 "safe access" to worksites 131 or maintenance of equipment free of "defects," 132 without defining those terms or providing any indication as to what conditions constitute a violation or what abatement is required.
These regulations give MSHA wide latitude in interpretation and enforcement.
For example, the regulations concerning absence of "defects" are interpreted to
require the maintenance of manufacturers' provided safety devices, even if
MSHA itself does not specifically require the devices. 133 Many of the regula128

Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 91-1282, reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5218 (1970)).

129

See, e.g., Molot, supra note 97, at 105-07. See also Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514

U.S. 87, 108 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that Secretary of Labor's interpretations
suggest she failed to fulfill her statutory rulemaking obligation).
130 30 C.F.R. § 75.360 (2001).
131 30 C.F.R. § 56.11001 (2001).
132

30 C.F.R. §§ 56.14100(b), 75.1725(a) (2001).

See, e.g., Lopke Quarries, Inc., 22 F.M.S.H.R.C. 899, 907 (2000), affd 23 F.M.S.H.R.C.
705 (2001) (lockout device not required by MSHA was defect when did not operate); Ideal Cement Co., 13 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1346, 1350 & n.l (1991).
133
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prudent person" test to
tions have been read to require the use of a "reasonably
34
preclude a finding of unconstitutional vagueness.1
But the more troubling aspect of such regulations is the latitude they
permit MSHA for inconsistency of enforcement. For example, in a case involving one of MSHA's guarding regulations,1 35 MSHA argued that the equipment
in question should be guarded to prevent all possible contact, not just inadvertent or accidental contact. The standard is a generic one that reads as follows:
Moving machine parts shall be guarded to protect persons from
contacting gears, sprockets, chains, drive, head, tail, and takeup
pulleys, flywheels, couplings, shafts, fan blades, and similar
136
moving parts that can cause injury.
The inspector believed that a guard should even protect against deliberate attempts to circumvent it, which of course, is not possible.
The guards that were in place on some of the equipment that was cited
had been constructed at the direction of an MSHA inspector in the 1980s. While
the operator ultimately prevailed in that case, it had to abate the citations long
before its case was heard and decided. Adding the attempted use of the deference doctrine onto this sort of scenario only creates the belief that the regulatory
system is unfair.
Another example of MSHA's inconsistent and unfair enforcement approach can be found in The Doe Run Co.. 137 There the standard issue required
the provision of two escapeways from the lowest "levels" of an underground
lead mine. The case involved three mines which had been in existence for a
number of years and which had been inspected by MSHA four times a year
throughout their existence. In September 1999, MSHA developed a new interpretation of what was meant by the term "level" and issued citations to the
mines which required them to redesign how they provided escapeways at substantial
cost.
•
.
,. The
138 judge found the standard ambiguous and deferred to MSHA's
He stated as follows:
interpretation.

134 See, e.g., Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co., 18 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1552 (1996) (interpreting
C.F.R. § 77.404(a)); Ariz. Portland Cement, 16 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1055, 1056 (1994) (interpreting
C.F.R. § 56.15005); Lanham Coal Co., 13 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1341, 1343 (1991) (interpreting
C.F.R. § 77.1710(g)); Ideal Cement Co., 12 F.M.S.H.R.C. 2409, 2414 (1990) (interpreting
C.F.R. § 56.9002); Ala. By-Products Corp., 4 F.M.S.H.R.C. 2128, 2129-30 (1982) (interpreting
C.F.R. § 75.1725(a)).
135 Tilden Mining Co. L.C., 24 F.M.S.H.R.C. 53 (2002).
136 30 C.F.R. § 56.14107(a) (2001).
137
138

30
30
30
30
30

22 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1243 (2000).
id. at 1249, 1251.
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In adhering to this policy [of deference], we occasionally defer
to "permissible" regulatory interpretations that diverge significantly from what a first-time reader of the regulations might
conclude was the "best" interpretation of their language. Cf.
American Fed. Gov't Employees v. FLRA, 778 F.2d 850, 856
(D.C. Cir. 1985) ("As a court of review . . . we are not positioned to choose from plausible readings the interpretation we
think best." (internal punctuation and citation omitted)). We
may defer where the agency's reading of the statute would not
be obvious to "the most astute reader." Rollins, 937 F.2d at 652.
And even where the petitioner advances a more plausible reading of the regulations than that offered by the agency,' 139
it is "the
agency's choice [that] receives substantial deference."
He held that both the operator and MSHA's interpretations were reasonable, but accepted MSHA's, despite the fact that such interpretation was not
necessarily evident in a first reading of the standard or even the best interpretation. 14 Such an approach can only create the impression of arbitrariness and
unfairness in the use of deference as well as in the regulatory system generally.
The judge further held that MSHA had not given the operator notice of
its interpretations and, in fact, had two prior formulations of its interpretation
and had arrived at the one he accepted only during the course of the litigation. 141
This too cannot impress upon the operator the validity of the regulatory system.
If it is thought that case was an isolated occurrence, in Akzo Nobel Salt,
Inc. v. FMSHRC,142 MSHA argued that the Court of Appeals should defer to its
interpretation of another portion of the regulation with respect to escapeways in
underground metal/nonmetal mines when it had only adopted that interpretation
after the Review Commission rejected the interpretation MSHA espoused before
the Commission.143 In addition, the Secretary there offered up at least one other
previous interpretation of the standard. While the consistency of an agency's
interpretation is supposed to be a factor in determining if an agency's interpretation is reasonable, 144 the Court in Akzo Nobel simply remanded the case so
MSHA could make up its mind. 145
139 Id.at 1251-52 (quoting Gen. Elec. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
140 Id.at 1252.
141 Id. at 1254-55.
142 212 F.3d 1301 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
143 Id.at 1304.

144 Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 418 (1993); Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. at
157; INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447 (1987);.see also Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines,
Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 698 (1991); Elliot Coal Mining Co., Inc. v. Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 17 F.3d 616, 626 (3d Cir. 1994).; Conoco, Inc. v. Skinner, 970 F.2d 1206, 1217 (3d Cir.
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Such inconsistency is not isolated and bedevils regulation under the
1977 Mine Act. 14 6 But the problems with MSHA's use of regulations do not
end with the general vagueness or its inconsistency. On occasion, it does exactly
what the commentators were concerned with: it changes the meaning of a generally worded standard radically without resorting to rulemaking. In Hibbing
Taconite Co.,147 it tried to do it by policy memorandum. In Keystone Coal Mining Corp., 148 it sought to do so by internal memorandum and enforcement procedures.
IV. CONCLUSION
The legislative history of the 1977 Mine Act shows that it was Congress's intention to create an independent agency that would review MSHA's
actions and interpretations. Congress also delegated policy making authority to
the Commission as well as to MSHA. Such an arrangement is unusual and defies easy characterization as coming within the deference parameters set out in
Chevron, Bowles v. Seminole Rock or Martin v. OSHRC.
It appears that, despite Congress's clear intention to make the mine
regulatory system credible and fair by requiring independent review of MSHA's
Comactions, the application of deference doctrines has resulted in the Review
149
mission having less independence than its predecessor captive tribunal.
The Supreme Court has indicated in United States v. Mead that it will
address the various types of administrative constructs that Congress might create
on a case-by-case basis. In the modem world of the administrative state, there is
a need for courts and other tribunals to serve as a check-and-balance upon administrative agencies who otherwise have little reason to curb their excesses.150
In MSHA's case, the application of deference doctrines increases the power of a
regulatory agency that already has extraordinary authority. All MSHA has to do
is argue that there is ambiguity in the regulations it promulgates and it can rely
1992); E.E.O.C v. City of Mt. Lebanon, Pa., 842 F.2d 1480 (3d Cir. 1988), abrogated on other
grounds as recognized by E.E.O.C. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 907 F.2d 1354, 1360 (3d Cir.
1990).
145
212 F.3d at 1305.
146

See also Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 15 F.M.S.H.R.C. 2428, 2435 & n.2 (1993) (recognizing

that identical cogeneration facilities were treated differently by MSHA in that it asserted jurisdiction at one but not the other).
147
21 F.M.S.H.R.C. 346 (1999). See also Drummond Co., 14 F.M.S.H.R.C. 661, 661 (1992)
(noting that agency tried to change assessment procedures by policy memorandum).
148
16 F.M.S.H.R.C. 6 (1994).
149
150

Lastowka & Sapper, supra note 4, at 117.
Johnson, supra note 5, at 345 (independent adjudication may balance the over aggressive-

ness of rulemaking); Molot, supra note 97, at 105-07.
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that its interpretation is "reasonable," which is not a very difficult
upon 5showing
1 1
task.
It is appropriate for the Review Commission and the Courts of Appeals
to re-evaluate what has become an automatic invocation of deference. It can be
argued that no deference and no weight should be accorded MSHA's interpretations before the Commission. The Review Commission has the expertise, experience, and policy authority to evaluate cases on a "level playing field."
But if that is not acceptable, it would seem appropriate to adopt the middle ground used by the Supreme Court in United States v. Mead in applying the
principles outlined in Skidmore v. Swift: assign the agency's interpretation
weight only to the extent that the agency can demonstrate that its interpretation
is persuasive, that it is, in fact, the "best" interpretation. If an agency is unable
(or unwilling) to do that, then it should be treated like any other litigant.
The oft-repeated argument that the agency is uniquely qualified to make
policy or interpret a law in an area that is complex and technical simply does not
pertain to the 1977 Mine Act. The Review Commission has a body of experience and knowledge because of the backgrounds of its Commissioners, as well
as the fact that all of its work is carried out within the narrow confines of the
mining industry. This confirms that it is properly positioned to serve as a proper
check and balance to MSHA's statutorily-driven regulatory zeal.1 52 The Review
Commission is not in the same position as a court that may be afraid to try to
understand a complex technical subject area. 153 The Commission deals with the
same sorts of issues as MSHA, and there is no evidence that it is incapable of
understanding mine safety and health regulation.
Even use of a Skidmore-type principle would provide an independent interpretive check on the agency because it places the burden of persuasion on the
agency, and it would encourage regulatory clarity by placing or emphasis over
clear accounts of regulatory meaning. 154 Some method of balancing MSHA's
authority must be in place. The Review Commission should not be permitted to
abdicate its role as an independent reviewer of the agency's action, and the
Courts should not be permitted to overlook the vital role the Commission plays.

151 Lastowka & Sapper, supra note 4, at 118.
152 See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 13, at 861 (stating that the 1977 Mine Act applies to
"discrete" employment sector whose membership is "homogenous").
153 Johnson, supra note 5, at 343 ("The health and safety hazards to which mining exposes its
workers tend to be the same, wherever the mine is located."). It should be noted with regard to the
technical complexity argument that if an agency cannot explain its policy choices to an intelligent
lay person, one is caused to wonder if that policy should be adopted or that the agency truly understands its own position.
154

Manning, supra note 110, at 687-88, 695.
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